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  The purpose of this paper is to explore the "anti-Europe" potential of the far right in five countries 
of Western Europe: Denmark, Germany, France, Belgium, and Italy.1  The conceptualization of the far 
right2 employed in this paper has two components: one focused on voting behavior and one on 
ideology (i.e, values and beliefs).  It is important to keep both analytically distinct.  Voting (behavior), 
in general, is critical because it determines the distribution of power in a democratic political system.  
The degree of success of radical parties therefore affects (and is effected by) the dynamics of 
competition in a political system, and it may also suggest something about the state of the democracy 
in it.  But people often vote for a radical or extremist party even though they do not agree with its 
platform.  Rather, they seek to "send a message" to the established elites (a phenomenon generally 
labeled "protest voting").3 
  If one wants to know more about individual citizens' attitudes and motivations, one must study 
these more directly.  This approach, which most often employs survey research, may also tell us much 
more about the underlying stability of a democracy, although this point often seems to be lost among 
students of extremism.4   
  One question remains unanswered to this point: why would anyone be interested in far right 
ideology (and voting) in the context of European politics and, more specifically, in the context of 
European social, economic, and political integration?  There are two basic answers to this question.  
First, one may wonder whether or not popular attitudes about the process of European integration are 
at all driven by ideology.  For example, since integration, especially its political variety, necessarily 
involves some surrendering of national sovereignty, and since the right has traditionally emphasized 
the prerogatives and importance of the nation state, one might expect adherents of the far right, and 
even many conservatives, to be more reluctant to support this process.  By contrast, economic 
integration may have many supporters among conservatives and liberals alike, but may run into 
opposition not only from the extremes of the political spectrum, but from the moderate left as well.   
  Second, to the extent that parties located on the far right of the political spectrum often attempt to 
make political hay out of their, more or less, professed opposition to the "Project Europe," one may be 
curious about the extent to which these parties are able to attract the "anti-Europe" vote.5  And, by 
extension, one may also want to speculate about the circumstances under which these parties may be 
able to do so even more effectively in the future.  It is these questions that this paper will address in the 
following pages. 
  Tables 1 through 4 provide some evidence of the relationship between ideology and support for 
various aspects of European integration.  Ideology here was measured by creating an additive index 
consisting of four, equally weighted components:6 left-right self-placement; xenophobia; preference 
for dictatorship over democracy; and far-right voting.7  Based on the median and standard deviation of 
this index, four categories were created: left & center (lowest value - median); center & Right (median 
+ 1 std. deviation); right (+ 2 std. deviations); extreme right (+ 3 std. deviations).  Several things are 
readily apparent from these four tables.  First, strong majorities of citizens in the five countries are in favor of a more unified Europe.  About 70% support the principle of "European Unification" (Table 1), 
almost as many support their country's membership in the European Community/Union (Table 2),8 and 
a clear majority "feel European" at least some of the time (Table 3).  While those who think that the 
Single Market is a "good thing" are not in a majority, only a relatively small minority of respondents 
feel that it is a "bad thing" (the rest are undecided). 
  The second outstanding finding of the first four tables is that there are clear differences with 
respect to ideology.  In every one of the tables the proportion of "supporters" drops as one moves from 
the center/left to the far right.  For example, only 18.8% of the most extremist respondents were very 
much for efforts to unify Western Europe (v. 33% of center-leftists), while slightly more (19.2%) were 
strongly opposed to these efforts (v. 4.2%).  Roughly speaking, one could say that support for the 
various pro-European items is only about half as strong on the extreme right, while opposition is about 
three times as high.  Clearly, our initial hypothesis, that support for Europe varies by ideology, is borne 
out by the data. 
  However, two caveats are just as apparent when looking at the first four tables.  First, there are 
relatively few respondents who qualify for the label "right" or even "far right."  Less than ten percent 
of all respondents in the sample fall into the former category, and only slightly more than five percent 
fall into the latter.9  Second, even among these respondents there is still substantial support for 
"Europe;" in fact in three of the four cases (European citizenship being the exception) support 
outweighs opposition, if by only a slight margin.  Nevertheless, taken together, these last two factors 
suggest that, under present circumstances, the far right by itself does not amount to, or seems unlikely 
be mobilized into, a substantial opposition force to the unification process. 
  The questions to be asked, therefore, would seem to be: (1) under what conditions might such an 
opposition arise, and (2) will the parties of the far right be able to take advantage of it.  It is to these 
questions that we will now turn our attention.  We begin with the second one of these two questions. 
  According to Hans-Georg Betz (1994) and several others who have done work in this area,10 the 
new radical right-wing parties that have sprung up in several West European countries, such as France, 
Germany, Denmark, Belgium, and Austria, should primarily be seen as a response to the increasing 
sense of frustration, alienation, and resentment among a growing segment of the population of these 
countries.  These symptoms, in turn, are the result of the profound economic, social, and cultural 
changes that have taken place in Western Europe during the past two decades and that have left many 
of its citizens with feelings of insecurity, isolation, and bewilderment.  If this line of reasoning is 
generally accurate, we would expect to find evidence of it in survey data collected in recent years in 
the above mentioned countries. 
  Table 5 indeed provides evidence that this is so.11  For ease of interpretation, I have grouped the 
various independent variables into three categories: cognitive orientations; political issues; and social-
background variables.  Overall, cognitive variables appear to be dominant, especially the left-right 
orientation.  However, issue variables play an important role in explaining the far right vote as well.  In 
particular, the radical right parties seem to have struck a responsive chord in their respective societies 
by their more or less overt (especially in the case of the Front National) appeals to xenophobia.  If one 
is willing to follow Betz (1994: 103), who maintains that this represents not so much the revival of 
racism per se, but rather an expression of fear and hopelessness among the citizens of Western Europe, 
then a number of important issues are actually wrapped up in this xenophobic response, including 
persistent unemployment; the housing shortage; welfare state issues; budget deficits, etc.  In all cases 
foreigners (asylum seekers, immigrants, guest workers, etc.) are seen as competitors for scarce 
resources - to be resented, shunned, and, ultimately, excluded.   
  Additional issue variables that are significantly related to far right voting are a dissatisfaction with 
the workings of democracy (i.e., an expression of the disenchantment with the established political 
elites), and, most relevant for present purposes, opposition to the process of European unification.   
This last finding establishes the basis for asking our second question, namely whether or not the new 
parties of the radical right may one day be able to mobilize disillusionment with, and resentment of, 
the European Union for their own political purposes. 
  Before proceeding to answer that question, two further notes about Table 5 are appropriate.  First, 
social background variables, especially class and education, but also gender and age, are either 
irrelevant or of only marginal importance in explaining far right voting.  This is interesting particularly 
in light of classic fascism theory, which often attributed that movement specifically to the middle class 
(see Lipset, 1981).  The finding of the slightly greater attractiveness of these parties to younger voters, however, is nothing new and has been reported by others in recent years (see: Schain, 1988; Castner & 
Castner, 1989; Betz, 1994).12  Second, the variables postmaterialism and cognitive mobilization are 
positively related to a willingness to vote for the far right, contrary to what one might expect.  This 
finding suggests that these voters do not necessarily conform to the stereotypical description far right 
voters as deprived, powerless, and parochial; instead they appear to be informed, motivated, and, 
possibly, quite efficacious. 
  A few years ago, the process of European integration seemed to be on a fast track, leading, in the 
minds of many, inexorably towards eventual economic, social, and political unification of the EC 
member states.  But, as it turned out, politicians and pundits alike had mistaken the breadth of public 
support of integration for depth and commitment.  Before too long, "Euro-phoria" had been replaced 
by "Euro-skepticism."  What were the reasons for this seemingly sudden disillusionment?  While a 
thorough discussion of these goes beyond the scope of this paper, it is clear that the aftermath of the 
collapse of communism in Eastern Europe (including the war in the former Yugoslavia and the EC's 
feeble response to it), the unification of Germany, and, in particular, the intense referendum debate 
over the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark focused public attention like never before on the Community, 
its institutions, and, most importantly, on the benefits it was supposed to provide for its members and 
citizens.  In particular, people were concerned with the "democracy deficit" and with the costs of 
certain new proposals, such as the currency union, that promised remote or uncertain benefits in the far 
too distant future. 
  Recent scholarship has shown that the increased attention by the public is not necessarily just the 
consequence of specific, highly publicized events, such as the Maastricht Treaty, but rather is related to 
the increasing shift from "negative" integration,13 which requires little more than a "permissive 
consensus" (Lindberg & Scheingold, 1970) to "positive" integration,14 which is more likely to raise 
questions about the costs and benefits of specific steps in this process (see Dalton & Eichenberg, 1993).  
A number of studies over the years have confirmed the importance of these cost/benefit calculations in 
the public's evaluation of the integration process (Inglehart, 1977a; Handley, 1981; Patterson & 
Sobisch, 1993; Dalton & Eichenberg, 1994). 
  Table 6 demonstrates this connection as well.  "Evaluative" (cost/benefit) variables15 are by a 
wide margin the most important predictors of the level of support for the European integration process.  
By contrast, cognitive as well as social background variables are of relatively minor importance.  
Interestingly, Table 6 also shows the impact of two factors closely associated with the far right, namely 
xenophobia and the democracy-dictatorship preference, with respondents on the anti-democratic end of 
both value scales less likely to support integration. 
  Finally, Table 6 also shows the importance of cross-national differences relative to individual 
level characteristics.  With Italy serving as the "suppressed category," only for Denmark do we find a 
strong nation-specific effect with respect to support for integration.  While the French and the Belgians 
are slightly less enthusiastic about the process than the Italians and Germans (at lest at the time of 
survey, in 1992), the magnitude of the standardized coefficients is dwarfed by those of the evaluative 
factors.  The Danes, of course, have long been known as Euro-skeptics.  
  The implication from Table 6 is clear: (continued) support for integration is highly sensitive to 
citizens' calculations of benefit of this process to their country and to themselves, and in that sense it is 
held hostage by the continued (perceived) performance of EU institutions and policies.  Stated 
differently, if there were a significant reversal of these perceptions, a substantial decline of public 
approval for the integration process could be expected. 
  It is at this point that our analysis of the far right picks up again.  Having shown in Table 5 that far 
right parties are, at least in principle, able to capitalize on anti-European sentiments, the question 
becomes whether such a downturn of the fortunes of the EU would disproportionately help to advance 
their cause.  It goes without saying that the answer to this question ultimately depends on a variety of 
factors, among them unquestionably also the behavior of the other parties in the respective party 
systems.16  However, since we are primarily interested at this point in generating some tentative 
evidence, a more complex analysis will have  to be left to the future (assuming that the present study 
turns up anything worth pursuing further). 
  Table 5 had shown, among other things, that far right voting was to a considerable extent helped 
by a certain ideological predisposition.  In fact, ideology had been the strongest variable in the model.  
The farther on the right of the ideological scale a respondent placed him or herself, the more likely that 
person was to express a willingness to vote for the far right.  The question one might therefore ask is whether or not there exists an interactive effect between ideology and the impact of cost/benefit 
evaluations on support for European integration.  Put differently, does the magnitude of the 
coefficients (in Table 6) vary by ideological position along the left-right scale?  If this is indeed the 
case, that is to say, if for persons on the right of political spectrum an increase in their negative 
evaluations of the benefits of the EU translates into a disproportional decline in support for the EU's 
integration process (compared to non-rightist), then the implication would be that the parties of the far 
right may also gather a significant electoral bonus should the integration process falter. 
  Table 7 provides evidence to the effect that this may indeed be the case.  The table presents the 
non-standardized regression coefficients for five subsets of Eurobarometer 37.  Each of the five subsets 
represents respondents who fall within certain intervals along the left-right self-placement scale.17  
Comparing the magnitude of the coefficients in the table reveals that on the right of the political 
spectrum, on average, given increases (decreases) along the scales of the three evaluative variables 
produce much larger increases (decreases) in the dependent variable, the "Unified Europe Support 
Index."  In other words, the evaluation of European integration among respondents on the right of the 
ideological spectrum is much more sensitive to changes in the evaluations of the costs and benefits of 
European integration.  Since it has already been shown that these individuals are more prone to vote 
for the far right (Table 5), and since the parties of the far right are likely the ones who will attempt to 
gain political capital from any increased disaffection among the general public with the European 
integration process, it stands to reason that these parties will also disproportionately benefit electorally 
from such a shift in public opinion.   
  The same can be said for xenophobia, although it must be admitted that the causal link between 
xenophobia and opposition to European integration is not as strong,18 and for that reason we will not 
attempt to make too much out of this connection.  Table 7 also reveals another interesting finding.  On 
the right of the political spectrum the differences between Danish respondents and those from the other 
countries are not nearly as strong. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
  What are the implications of our findings?  For once, the reader must be reminded of the tentative 
nature of these findings and of the need to refine the analysis with additional variables and at different 
time points.  For example, it would seem sensible to try to identify more precisely what it is about the 
European Community /Union that those on the right side of the political spectrum are concerned about.  
In other words, what is the content of their "cost/benefit" calculations? 
  Substantively speaking, it is clear that one cannot take for granted the continued support of the 
European public for the integration process, and a sharp decline in support was in fact noticeable after 
1991/2.  This seems particularly to be the case on the right, where one might suspect, for example, a 
greater reluctance to relinquish certain symbols of national sovereignty (e.g., the currency, control over 
borders, etc.).  A perceived "attack" on these symbols, along with a general sense of economic 
difficulties, could easily translate into a prolonged drop of support for the integration process.  There 
are any number of issues around which a vigorous opposition could galvanize, including continued 
budget and transfer imbalances (e.g., Germany as "Zahlmeister" of Europe); a mishandling of the 
immigration/asylum problem; new foreign policy disasters; and even the simple perception that the 
free inter-European trade is no longer a net benefit for a country. 
  By the same token, it is not at all unlikely that the far right might find common ground across the 
European landscape and that it may find it expedient to cooperate in the name of "European 
civilization," as Betz had speculated so eloquently in the conclusion to his recent book.  The success of 
this strategy will, however, depend to a large extent on their (the far right leaders') ability to convince 
their constituencies that this is the more prudent course of action.  Given the traditions of the far right, 
this scenario is not at all certain. 
 
Table 1  
 
Support for European Unification 
by Political Ideology, 1992*  
       very much  to some extent:  very much 
                 for    for     against  against  N 
                 ------------------------------------------------ 
Left & Center  :  33.0%    49.3     10.2  4.2    2,165 
Center & Right   :  24.5    48.4     15.5  5.5    1,414 
Right  :  21.3   48.0       15.7  7.7    375 
Extr. Right  :  18.8    33.8     21.7  19.2    240 
                 ------------------------------------------------- 
           4 , 1 9 4    
 
   * Percentages do not add up to 100 because "don't know" category 
     has been excluded from table 
 
   (For question wording and index construction see Appendix) 
    
   Source: Eurobarometer 37 
 
 
Table 2 
 
Support for Country's EC Membership 
by Political Ideology, 1992* 
 
                    good thing  neither  bad thing  N 
                 ------------------------------------------ 
Left  &  Center  :  72.2%   15.7   9.7   2,166 
Center  &  Right  :  62.6   20.3   13.1   1,413 
Right    :  54.1   24.3   17.6   375 
Extr.  Right   :  47.5   20.4   27.5   240 
                 ------------------------------------------ 
                                                         4,194  
 
   * Percentages do not add up to 100 because "don't know" category 
     has been excluded from table 
 
   (For question wording and index construction see Appendix) 
    
   Source: Eurobarometer 37 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
 
Feeling of European v. National Citizenship 
by Political Ideology, 1992* 
 
   "Feel as Citizen of Europe": 
     often   sometimes  never   N 
                 ------------------------------------------ 
Left  &  Center  :  18.9%   44.2   36.9   2,161 
Center  &  Right  :  11.6   35.4   52.9   1,409 
Right    :  13.1   32.5   54.4   375 
Extr.  Right   :  9.7   29.8   60.5   238 
                 ------------------------------------------            4 , 1 8 3    
 
   * Percentages do not add up to 100 because "don't know" category 
     has been excluded from table 
 
   (For question wording and index construction see Appendix) 
    
   Source: Eurobarometer 37 
 
 
Table 4 
 
Opinion Concerning the Single Market 
by Political Ideology, 1992* 
 
                    good thing  neither  bad thing  N 
                 ------------------------------------------ 
Left  &  Center  :  49.6%   32.8   9.6   2,137 
Center  &  Right  :  40.9   36.9   12.9   1,400 
Right    :  40.4   33.7   16.4   371 
Extr.  Right   :  31.0   30.5   30.1   239 
                 ------------------------------------------ 
           4 , 1 4 7    
 
   * Percentages do not add up to 100 because "don't know" category 
     has been excluded from table 
 
   (For question wording and index construction see Appendix) 
    
   Source: Eurobarometer 37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
 
Multivariate Analysis (OLS) 
 
Dependent Variable = Vote for Far Right Parties* 
 
   Variable            b  beta    p<.05 
   ------------------------------------------------------ 
      L-R  Ideology     .03   .22   .00 
   Democracy-Dictatorship Pref.  .16    .14    .00 
   Cognitive Mobilization      .01  .06    .00 
      Postmaterialism    .02   .05   .00 
      Xenophobia     .16   .15   .00 
   Satisfaction with Democracy   .02  .09    .00 
   Support for Europ. Integr.      .02  .07    .00 
    
      Age    .00  .05   .00 
      E d u c a t i o n          . 1 0  
      Gender    .02  .05   .00 
      C l a s s          . 0 6      
   * For details on questions and indices, see Appendix 
 
   R2: .14 
   N=4,159 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
 
Multivariate Analysis (OLS) 
 
Dependent Variable = Support for Unified Europe (Index)* 
 
   Variable    b  beta    p<.05 
------------------------------------------------------ 
EC  benefits  country     .28   .30   .00 
SM  benefits  country     .29   .28   .00 
SM  benefits  respondent    .20   .15   .00 
Xenophobia    .28  .08   .00 
Democracy-Dictatorship  Pref.    .30  .08   .00 
Cognitive Mobilization       .01  .06    .00 
Postmaterialism                     .56 
      Age    .00  .05   .00 
      Education     .01   .03   .00 
   Gender                      .66 
      Denmark    .54  .27   .00 
   France      .19  .09    .00 
   Belgium      .13  .06    .00 
      G e r m a n y          . 0 7  
 
   R2: .47 
   N=4,627 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 
 
Multivariate Analysis (OLS) 
 
Dependent Variable = Support for Unified Europe (Index) 
by L-R Ideological Position* 
 
          Ideological Position 
      Variable  1-3  1-5  4-7  6-10  8-10       
     
   -------------------------------------------------------- 
EC  benefits  country   .31   .26   .26   .32 
 .33 SM  benefits  country   .21   .25   .29   .33 
 .35 
SM  benefits  respondent   .18   .17   .16   .19 
 .22 
Xenophobia   .11   .28   .35   .35   .46 
      Denmark   .89   .74   .74   .36   .35 
      France   .19   .22   .22   .16   .19 
   Belgium          .12    .12 
   --------------------------------------------------------- 
      R2  .52   .47   .45   .49   .53 
   N     711  2,216  2,487  1,632    633    
 
   * For details on questions and indices, see Appendix 
APPENDIX 
 
 
1. Question wording in Tables 1 through 4: 
 
(1) "In general, are you for or against effort being made to unify Western Europe?" 
 
 
(2) "Generally speaking, do you think that your country's membership of the Common Market is a 
good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?" 
 
(3) "Does the thought ever occur to you that you are not only (Nationality of respondent) but also a 
European?  Does this happen often, sometimes, or never? 
 
(4) "Personally, would you say that the Single European Market is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither 
good nor bad?" 
 
 
2. Support for Europe Index (simple additive): 
 
(1) See question 1. above 
 
(2) "If you were told tomorrow that the European Community had been scrapped, would you be very 
sorry about it, indifferent, or very relieved?" 
 
 
3. Ideology scale (additive index divided by median and standard deviation) 
 
(1) Left-right self placement along 10-point scale 
(2) Far right voting (based on three questions a. vote in last election, b. vote if election held tomorrow, 
c. party identification; any respondent naming far right party (see note 1.) in any one of three question 
is coded a potential far right voter 
(3) Democracy-dictatorship preference ("Here are some opinions about political systems.  Which one 
comes closest to your own way of thinking: a. democracy is the best political system in all 
circumstances, b. in certain circumstances a dictatorship could be a good thing, c. whether we live in a 
democracy or under a dictatorship makes no difference to people like me") 
(4) Xenophobia (an additive index consisting of 8 questions about immigrants from south of the 
Mediterranean, Eastern Europe, and those seeking asylum; preference regarding the rights and quantity 
of foreign population in country; and feeling towards people of other nations, religions, and races)  
 
 
4. Cost/Benefit Indicators: 
 (1) "Taking everything into consideration, would you say that our country has on balance benefitted or 
not from being a member of the European Community ?" 
(2) "Do you think that the Single European Market will have a positive effect, a negative effect, or no 
effect at all on a. your personal life, b. our country?" 
 
 
5. Postmaterialism and Cognitive Mobilization: see Inglehart, 1977b. 
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